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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 David Basil Mercer appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered upon 
the district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
In 2008, Mercer pled guilty to felony driving under the influence; the court 
imposed a unified 10-year sentence, with five years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., p.22.)  Following the jurisdictional review period, the court 
placed Mercer on probation.  (R., p.22.)  Mercer later violated his probation and, 
in 2013, the court revoked Mercer’s probation and ordered his sentence 
executed.  (R., p.22.)  Mercer filed an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce his sentence, 
which the court denied.  (R., p.22.)   
On appeal from the orders revoking probation and denying Rule 35 relief, 
Mercer claimed the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and 
denying his request for a reduced sentence.  State v. Mercer, Docket No. 41068, 
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 393 (Idaho App. Feb. 25, 2014).  The Court of 
Appeals rejected Mercer’s claims and affirmed.  Id.  The Remittitur issued on 
March 19, 2014.  (R., p.22.)      
On October 30, 2014, Mercer filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief raising a variety of claims including a claim that he was “subject to double 
jeopardy do [sic] to the fact [that he] did 30 days discretionary for resisting and 
obstructing and then [sic] again was used against [him] for [a] probation 
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violation.”   (R., pp.5-15.)  Mercer also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.  
(R., pp.16-18.)   
The district court issued a Notice of Intent to Partially Dismiss Claims 
(“Notice”), notifying Mercer of its intent to dismiss the majority of the claims 
Mercer alleged in his petition.  (R., pp.21-26.)  On the same date the court issued 
its Notice, it entered an Order Appointing Counsel on Certain Claims.  (R., pp.28-
29.)  In particular, the court appointed counsel on Mercer’s claim that counsel 
was ineffective during probation revocation proceedings and on his claim that 
“the revocation of probation was a violation of double jeopardy because [Mercer] 
had done discretionary time and then had his probation revoked for the same 
conduct.”  (R., pp.28-29 (bold omitted).)   Twenty-eight days after issuing its 
Notice and appointing counsel, the court dismissed the claims that were the 
subject of its notice of intent to dismiss.  (R., pp.35-40.)  
With the assistance of counsel, Mercer filed a supplemental affidavit to 
support his petition.  (R., pp.57-59.)  Although Mercer’s supplemental affidavit did 
not specifically mention “double jeopardy,” he did assert that defense counsel did 
not file a motion to dismiss “the allegation in the Motion for Probation Violation 
that alleged the new charge of Resisting and Obstructing Officers,” noted he 
“had previously been ordered discretionary jail time as a result of that new 
charge,” and averred that he “believe[d] the court imposed [his] sentence 
primarily relying on the new charge for which [he] had already been punished.”  
(R., p.59 ¶ 9.)   
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After Mercer filed his supplemental affidavit, the state filed an Answer (R., 
pp.67-69), and a separate motion for summary dismissal and supporting 
memorandum (R., pp.70-71, 76-83).  The state specifically addressed, and 
requested dismissal of, Mercer’s double jeopardy claim.  (R., pp.82-83.)  The 
court held a hearing on the state’s motion on June 25, 2015.  (See generally Tr.)  
Following the summary dismissal hearing, the district court issued an 
Order for Summary Dismissal and Notice of Intent to Dismiss Allegation 9 
(“Order”).  (R., pp.146-157.)  In that Order, the court indicated the double 
jeopardy issue “was previously dismissed by the Court in the Order Partially 
Dismissing Claims.”  (R., pp.151-152.)  The district court subsequently entered 
an order dismissing “Allegation 9” (R., pp.159-160), and entered a judgment of 
dismissal (R., p.162), from which Mercer timely appealed (R., pp.166-169). 
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ISSUE 
 
 Mercer states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Mercer’s 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief because it erroneously believed 
that it had already dismissed the double jeopardy claim? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Although Mercer is correct in his assertion that the record indicates the 
district court erroneously believed it dismissed his double jeopardy claim in 
conjunction with its Notice of Intent to Partially Dismiss Claims, is he incorrect in 
his assertion that the district court’s erroneous belief requires reversal and 
remand for consideration of a double jeopardy claim that fails as a matter of law? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Mercer Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court’s 
Judgment Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition  
 
A. Introduction 
 Mercer challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition 
only on the basis that the district court erred in finding it had summarily 
dismissed Mercer’s double jeopardy claim as part of its initial Notice.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-12.)  The state agrees that the record supports a finding 
that Mercer’s double jeopardy claim was not dismissed as part of the district 
court’s initial Notice.  Such a finding does not, however, require reversal for two 
reasons.  First, Mercer’s complaint about the district court’s erroneous belief 
could and should have been raised to the district court in response to the order 
of dismissal.  Second, even if Mercer was not required to raise the issue below, 
this Court may affirm the denial of relief on Mercer’s double jeopardy claim 
because the claim fails as a matter of law, and Mercer received notice of this 
defect in the state’s request for summary dismissal.  Mercer has failed to show 
any basis for relief on appeal.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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C. Mercer Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court’s 
Judgment Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition 
 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative.  “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s 
claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
Mercer’s double jeopardy claim is based on his assertion that double 
jeopardy prevents a court from imposing discretionary jail time for conduct that 
constitutes a probation violation and subsequently revoking probation based on 
that same conduct.  (R., pp.7-8, 59.)  In its initial Notice, the district court 
acknowledged Mercer’s double jeopardy claim, but did not state its intent to 
dismiss this claim.  (R., pp.25-26)  In fact, in its order appointing counsel, the 
district court specifically identified Mercer’s double jeopardy claim as one of the 
claims for which counsel was appointed.  (R., pp.28-29.)  The Order Partially 
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Dismissing Claims was consistent with the court’s Notice and did not purport to 
dismiss Mercer’s double jeopardy claim.1  (R., pp.39-40.)    
Because the district court did not dismiss Mercer’s double jeopardy claim, 
Mercer included an allegation relevant to that claim in his supplemental affidavit.  
(R., p.59 ¶ 9.)  The state also addressed the claim in its request for summary 
dismissal.  (R., pp.82-83.)  However, in the Order the court entered after the 
summary dismissal hearing, the court noted the double jeopardy claim was 
referenced in both the state’s motion and Mercer’s supplemental affidavit, but 
stated “this issue was previously dismissed by the Court in the Order Partially 
Dismissing Claims.”  (R., p.152.)  Mercer correctly argues that the district court 
was incorrect in this regard, and asks this Court to “vacate the judgment, and 
remand the case for consideration of the double jeopardy claim.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.9-12.)  Mercer’s request for relief should be denied for two reasons.   
First, Mercer could, and should, have made his request for relief to the 
district court.  See Rule I.R.C.P. 52(b) (“No party may assign as error the lack of 
findings unless the party raised such issue to the trial court by an appropriate 
motion.”).  When the district court entered its Order and incorrectly stated it had 
previously dismissed the double jeopardy claim, it also entered a notice of intent 
                                            
1 Like the Notice, the Order Partially Dismissing Claims noted the double 
jeopardy claim, but the double jeopardy claim was not included in the Conclusion 
section of the order, which outlined the dismissed claims.  (R., pp.39-40.)  
Further, the double jeopardy claim was referenced in conjunction with a number 
of other claims, which the district court dismissed because the claims had 
“already been litigated on appeal.”  (R., pp.39-40.)  Since Mercer did not litigate a 
double jeopardy claim in his prior appeal, this could not have been a reason for 
dismissing the claim in post-conviction.   
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to dismiss “Allegation 9” and gave Mercer 20 days to respond to dismissal of that 
allegation.  (R., pp.156-157.)  Mercer did not file a response.  (See R., p.159.)  
While the 20-day response time applied to Allegation 9, Mercer could have 
responded to the court’s Order during that timeframe and advised the court of its 
error in relation to the double jeopardy claim rather than raise his complaint for 
the first time on appeal.  Mercer failed to do so and should be precluded from 
raising the complaint for the first time on appeal.  Cf. DeRushe v. State, 146 
Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2008) (post-conviction petitioner cannot 
challenge lack of specificity in notice for the first time on appeal); Caldwell v. 
State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794, 802-803 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing I.R.C.P. 
52(b) in conjunction with rejecting petitioner’s request for “remand and a new 
evidentiary hearing” because district court failed to address a claim in its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law).  
 Even if it is proper for Mercer to complain about the district court’s 
mistaken belief regarding the dismissal of his double jeopardy claim for the first 
time on appeal, there is no need to vacate the district court’s judgment 
dismissing Mercer’s petition and remand this case because the claim fails as a 
matter of law. 
There are three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy 
Clause:  protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense.  Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 
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(1980) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes 
omitted)).  As noted in the state’s request for summary dismissal,  
Revocation of probation constitutes neither a multiple trial 
nor a multiple punishment; it does not involve a new trial to 
consider the guilt or innocence of matters already decided, and it 
does not involve an additional punishment, because the revocation 
of probation involves only the enforcement of conditions already 
imposed. 
  
(R., pp.82-83 (quoting State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 155, 721 P.2d 1248, 
1254 (1986).)  Similarly, and as also noted in the state’s request for summary 
dismissal, in State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 292 P.3d 258 (2012), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that discretionary jail time and the revocation of probation 
based on the same conduct does not violate due process. (R., p.83.)   
Given the limited scope of the double jeopardy clause, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Chapman and Scraggins, there is no legal basis for 
Mercer’s double jeopardy claim.  Indeed, Mercer failed to provide any legal 
authority to support his double jeopardy claim in response to the state’s motion 
for summary dismissal, and he has failed to do so on appeal.  Because Mercer’s 
double jeopardy claim is not legally cognizable, this Court may affirm the 
judgment dismissing Mercer’s post-conviction petition without remanding for 
further consideration of that claim.  This result is consistent with the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion in Caldwell, supra. 
 In Caldwell, the petitioner claimed on appeal that the district court erred by 
failing to address the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim he 
alleged in his post-conviction petition.  159 Idaho at ___, 358 P.3d at 801.  The 
petitioner acknowledged he did not raise his complaint to the district court.  Id.  
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The state asserted that the district court’s failure to address the claim was 
“immaterial” because an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim is 
not cognizable under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.  Id.  The Court 
of Appeals agreed and concluded, “even if the district court had addressed this 
claim, dismissal would have been the only appropriate action.”  Id. at ___, 358 
P.3d at 802.  See also Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 
(2010) (“Because this Court employs the same standards on appellate review 
that the trial court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, if [the petitioner] failed to provide admissible evidence 
supporting [his] claims, they were properly dismissed.”).  
 As in Caldwell, dismissal of Mercer’s double jeopardy claim is the only 
appropriate action.  Accordingly, Mercer has failed to show any basis for 
reversing the district court’s judgment and “remand[ing] the case for 
consideration of the double jeopardy claim.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment 
dismissing Mercer’s petition for post-conviction relief.  
 DATED this 5th day of May, 2016. 
       
 _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of May, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 SALLY J. COOLEY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JML/dd 
 
 
